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ON BANDIT ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR (IL)LEGITIMACY:  CONCEPT 
DEVELOPMENT AND ILLUSTRATION 
ABSTRACT 
Outlaw organizations are neglected in organization studies. This is understandable given the 
presumption of illegitimacy they attract. Our paper challenges the presumption by positing 
the concept of ‘bandit organizations’, demonstrating how some can build impressive levels of 
legitimacy among their audience. The case of Christopher “Dudas” Coke, a philanthropic 
Jamaican drug cartel leader, and his ‘Shower Posse’ gang, is used to investigate how 
contemporary bandit organizations foster legitimacy. By placing ‘shadow economy’ 
organizations like this in the spotlight, we seek to extend scholarship on organizational 
legitimacy, while avoiding any undue romanticization of criminal organizations. 
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In late May 2010, after sustained pressure from US authorities, the Jamaican security 
forces stormed Tivoli Gardens, an impoverished neighbourhood in West Kingston, Jamaica, 
where they believed the notorious drug trafficker, Christopher “Dudus” Coke, was hiding. 
Fearing that the operation would fail, the Jamaican Prime Minister, Bruce Golding, appealed 
to the “law-abiding residents of Tivoli Gardens” to immediately evacuate the area. Despite 
the warnings, most residents remained loyal to Coke. He was regarded as their rightful leader 
or ‘Don’. A few days later, thousands of women took to the streets of downtown Kingston 
with placards reading, “Taking Di Boss is Like Taking Jesus”, “After God, Dudus Comes 
Next” and “Jesus Die for Us. We Will Die for Dudus”. The author Marlon James would later 
draw on this extraordinary environment in his prize winning novel A Brief History of Seven 
Killings, capturing the unhappy paradoxes that define a world ruled by gangsters with 
scruples, criminals with morals, wanton violence and community spirit.      
Illicit organizations such as the one led by Christopher Coke are conspicuously under 
theorized and researched in organization studies (see Parker, 2008; Parker, 2011). This is 
somewhat problematic given the sizable presence they reputedly have in international trade 
and geopolitical relations, albeit within a ‘shadow economy’ characterized by violence 
(Glenny, 2015). According to some estimates, organized crime makes up almost quarter of 
annual global GDP (Glenny, 2009). And a United Nations report speculates that in 2009 
organized crime laundered approximately US$1.6 trillion, which, if correct, would account 
for 8% of all international trade in merchandize (UNODC, 2013).  
Despite their considerable influence, these organizations are probably neglected by 
researchers because of their highly illegitimate status. Despite a few exceptions (e.g., see 
Vaccaro, A. & Palazzo, G. 2015; Schoeneborn & Scherer, 2012) organization studies has 
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understandably gravitated towards institutions that hold widespread credibility, even when 
investigating the global economy (e.g., Vaara and Tienari 2008; Henisz and Zelner, 2005) 
and non-state/non-corporate actors (e.g., Scherer and Palazzo, 2011). However, herein lies 
the compelling ‘mystery’ (Alvesson and Sandberg, 2013) our paper seeks to explain. It 
appears that Christopher Coke and his ‘Shower Posse’ (so named after how enemies were 
‘showered’ with bullets) did actually maintain considerable levels of organizational 
legitimacy in parts of Kingston, even overshadowing the Jamaican State. Coke was no doubt 
a dangerous gang leader, but also a proactive philanthropist who made considerable public 
investments in an otherwise penurious community. The case therefore provides a challenging 
and yet timely opportunity to significantly extend our knowledge of organizational legitimacy 
by investigating its presence in a context where we might assume it least likely to exist: in 
and around a violent criminal institution. 
Solving this mystery is made difficult in light of the research that does explicitly 
discuss criminal organizations and gangs. Although they may count for nearly a quarter of 
global GDP, they tend to be studied from a sociology of deviance perspective. Gilman, 
Goldhammer and Weber’s (2011) influential ‘deviant globalization’ thesis epitomizes this 
approach. They argue that with the rise of globalization and subsequent liberalization of 
national economies, ‘deviant entrepreneurs’ (e.g., drug dealers, international traders of illegal 
sex, protected species, and human body parts, etc.) have stepped into the vacuum left by a 
shrinking nation-state. Such organizations are defined by the moral “yuck factor” (Gilman et 
al., 2011: 14) they inspire in us. Notwithstanding the problematic historical narrative 
underlying this argument (as if criminal gangs never existed before the advent of neoliberal 
capitalism), viewing Christopher Coke, for example, as a ‘deviant’ would miss some of the 
rather conventional ways his organization attempted to build legitimacy. Indeed, Liazos’s 
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(1972) enduring criticism of the biases in deviance studies also applies to much research on 
outlaw organizations:  
… (1) Despite the attempt to show that the “deviant” is not different from the rest of 
us, the very emphasis on his identity and subculture may defeat that aim. (2) Certain 
forms of “deviance,” especially by the economic and political elite, are neglected. (3) 
The substantive analyses of sociologists of deviance contain no exploration of the role 
of power in the very designation of “deviance,” despite their many statements to the 
contrary (Liazos, 1972: 103).      
 We do not profess to totally overcome such biases. To lessen their influence, 
however, we turn to an alternative literature. Christopher Coke and his organization fits the 
description of what the historian Eric Hobsbawm (1959, 1969) termed the social bandit. 
These are frequently violent “outlaws whom the lord and state regard as criminals, but who 
remain within peasant society, and are considered by their people as heroes, as champions, 
avengers, fighters for justice, perhaps even leaders of liberation, and in any case as men to be 
admired, helped and supported” (Hobsbawm, 1969: 17). 
 This is arguably a romanticized rendition of the bandit. And according to Hobsbawm, 
social bandits are premodern peasant movements that largely disappeared with the rise of the 
modern nation-state. However, drawing on Hobsbawm and others, we develop the concept of 
the bandit organization and argue for its utility in grasping the legitimacy processes they 
deploy. This theoretical platform provides a more reliable way to study how organizations 
like the Shower Posse manage (or mismanage) legitimacy, especially in light of the 
limitations underlying the sociology of deviance literature.  
 The paper is structured as follows. First we define bandit organizations and discuss 
four ways they can be perceived, using dimensions posited by Hobsbawm (1969) (i.e., the 
social versus anti-social bandit) and Olson (2000) (i.e., the stationary versus roving bandit).  
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Then the concept of organizational legitimacy is introduced. We draw mainly on 
Suchman’s (1995) widely cited study for a number of reasons. Given its generic qualities, his 
framework can be applied to a wide range of organizations, which is obviously helpful in this 
case. And given its substantial influence on scholarship to date, the approach offers a very 
familiar language to discuss an extremely unfamiliar phenomenon in the academy. This will 
hopefully encourage future research.  
The rise and fall of Christopher Coke and his Shower Posse organization is then 
presented as an example of organizational banditry. The case is doubly relevant not only 
because of Coke’s success but also eventual failure. The subsequent demise of Coke’s empire 
reveals how the legitimacy of bandit organizations is fluid, involving multiple audiences and 
seldom static as circumstances change.  
The discussion directly tackles our research question concerning how bandit 
organizations like this might build legitimacy. And lastly we unpack the implications our 
findings have for future organizational research.    
 
INTRODUCING THE BANDIT ORGANIZATION 
Ways of Seeing the Bandit 
We suggest that the concept of the bandit or what we term ‘bandit organizations’ 
provides a useful vehicle to explore how legitimacy is created (or not) by institutions that 
most scholarship considers illegitimate by default. The word ‘bandit’ tends to imply a type of 
individual rogue. But it actually refers to a mode of social activity, derived from ‘band’ or 
banner in Old English (a form of human association), that is legally and/or politically 
‘banned’ (from the word bandito in Old Italian) and/or occupies a banned territory 
(Hobsbawm, 1969).  
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Modern connotations often impute bandits with a certain moral superiority or what 
some call the ‘Robbin Hood effect’ (Antony, 1989). They are seen to be officially outside the 
law but nevertheless morally above it because bandits champion the interests of those 
oppressed by official authority. Criminal scoundrels to the state, heroes to a popular audience, 
what the ‘Robin Hood’ style of bandit signifies is clearly, to a large extent, in the eye of the 
beholder.  
 We define the bandit organization as a form of association or ‘band’ (frequently led 
by a charismatic individual) that occupies a space outside national and/or international 
credibility but inside the everyday practical and moral organization of specific audiences. 
This is often marked by popular adulation, heroes who stand up ‘for the people’, but by no 
means always (Blok, 1972). Indeed, given the allusions to Robin Hood it is easy to see why 
bandits can be unduly glorified, a process that tends to occur among later generations who did 
not directly witness the violence enacted by them (see Cassia, 1993). We attempt to avoid 
this romanticization by developing a non-essentialist approach to bandit organizations. Rather 
than illustrate different static ‘types’ of bandits (as Hobsbawm [1969] does), we posit 
different ways of seeing them. For what we are analysing “rests not so much on the actual 
deeds of the bandits as on what people thought them to be, or, more precariously, on how 
they were reported by balladeers” (Chandler, 1978: 241).  
This helps explain why the same bandit organization can signify different things to 
different or even the same audience. Unlawful to some. Expedient to others. An outright hero 
for others yet. The approach is also useful for capturing the dynamic nature of organizational 
legitimacy since it is seldom fixed or static across time and/or audiences (e.g., see Aguilera & 
Cuerzo-Cazzura, 2005). Moreover, the perspectival framework on legitimacy helps us 
partially transcend the ‘mainstream vs. deviant’ dualism that can be conceptually 
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constraining. Below we use Hobsbawm (1969) and Olson’s (2002) influential categories to 
posit four ways of seeing the bandit organization.  
Social vs. Anti-Social Bandits 
In his seminal study of the topic, Eric Hobsbawm (1969) differentiates between 
‘social’ bandits and other types of banditry, particularly ‘anti-social’ bandits. The distinction 
is made in terms of “power i.e., of the control by governments or other power centres over 
what goes on in the territories and among the populations over which they have control” 
(Hobsbawm, 1969: 11). To simplify somewhat, anti-social bandits are outlaws who exploit 
and even reinforce the dominant power structure to maintain their interests. They are not 
necessarily ‘for the people’ but opportunistic, leveraging official gaps in governance, as do 
Robber Barons, gangster capitalists and elements of the Mafia. However, even though anti-
social, they still have sources of legitimacy, as we shall soon argue.  
Social bandits, on the other hand, are outlaws who are also considered subversive to 
the powerful (be it the state, economic elites, internal regulatory bodies, etc.). What 
differentiates them from simple criminals is the ability to channel popular discontent, often 
through acts of violent retribution. Being a Marxian historian, Hobsbawm emphasized class 
inequality as the primary backdrop from which the social bandit emerges. The more 
pronounced a bandit’s opposition to the ruling elite, the greater its degree of sociality; the 
more the bandit is perceived a correlate of the prevailing power bloc, the less social it is 
thought to be.  
Hobsbawm concentrates on social bandits and distinguishes three types. First are 
‘primitive resistance fighters’ (Haiduks). They are defined by constant mobility as they hijack 
trade routes and state emissaries. Their acts of popular justice are not meant to be 
revolutionary since they have no intention of replacing the state. Second are ‘terror-bringing 
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avengers’ who are characterized by their liking for egregious violence. In Hobsbawm’s 
(1969: 58) words, “they are heroes not in spite of the fear and horror their actions inspire, but 
in some ways because of them”. They use force to raise awareness about societal inequalities. 
And that is the basis of their respect, “proving that even the poor and weak can be terrible” 
(Hobsbawm, 1969: 58). And third are ‘noble robbers’. They gain local trust by actively trying 
to replace state functions: “whatever the actual practice, there is no doubt that this bandit is 
considered an agent of justice, indeed a restorer of morality, and often considers himself as 
such” (Hobsbawm, 1969: 44).   
It is tempting to protest that Hobsbawm glamorizes the social bandit. But he was 
ultimately sceptical about their capacity to become sustainable agents of justice. According to 
Hobsbawm (1969: 24), the erratic organizational qualities that define the bandit make them 
poor substitutes for a sustainable governing body. The avenger destroys rather than 
constructs; resistance fighters refuse enduring ties with a community; and the noble robber, 
while deeply caring for the community, often loses interest in the mundane business of civic 
management. Notwithstanding this, bandits “can unintentionally increase social welfare by 
opposing unpopular laws, by providing checks against government predation, and by 
providing legal services and protection when government does not” (Curott and Fink, 2012: 
45).    
Roving vs Stationary Bandits. 
The social bandit is clearly Hobsbawm’s main focus. They win loyalty by appealing 
to an idea of justice, if only in relative terms, and generally display a short-term interest in 
their immediate environment. This theory has been significantly extended by Olson’s (2000) 
economic model of bandits and helps us address the question of legitimacy.  
9 
 
Olson adopts a far less romantic understanding of the bandit than Hobsbawm, 
emphasizing that their main raison d’etre is larceny. However, he also recognizes that bandits 
must gain and maintain legitimacy over time, typically by exceeding their own narrow and 
immediate self-interests. Olson directly probes the issue of legitimacy by distinguishing 
between roving and stationary bandits. The rational reaction of a community is to want as 
little theft as possible. If banditry is inevitable, then bandits who appear and disappear 
quickly would seem preferable. Yet, according to Olson, that is not always the case. As he 
puts it, “why should warlords who were simply stationary bandits continuously stealing from 
a given group of victims be preferred, by those victims, to roving bandits who soon departed? 
The warlords had no claim to legitimacy and their thefts were distinguished from those of 
roving bandits only because they took the form of relentless tax theft rather than occasional 
plunder” (Olson, 2000: 7). 
For Olson (2000), the problematic feature of the roving bandit is their profligate 
disregard for the damage they inflict. Contrary to the stationary bandit, its roving counter-part 
does not have what Olson (2000) terms an ‘encompassing interest’ in its audience. This long-
term bond, whether based on morality or self-interest, is what allows the stationary bandit to 
forge deeper bonds of legitimacy among its community: “the encompassing interest of a 
stationary bandit leader who can continue to keep out not only other criminals but outside tax 
collectors as well gives him an incentive to behave very differently” (Olson, 2000: 8). This 
implies an important paradox. Stationary bandits have “an incentive to provide public goods 
that benefit this domain and those from whom his tax theft is taken. Paradoxically, he 
provides these public goods with money that he fully controls and could spend entirely on 
himself” (Olson, 2000: 9) 
Four Perspectives on the Organizational Bandit 
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Combining Hobsbawm and Olson’s analyses allows us to map the variety of 
perspectives through which we may regard the organizational bandit.  
First, we can evaluate the extent to which a bandit is social or anti-social. Following 
Hobsbawm, the more clearly a bandit organization represents the ‘people’, and positions 
itself against what is perceived as an oppressive or ineffectual power (the government, 
corporations, etc.) the more social they are. If, on the other hand, they are perceived to be 
informally aligned with the official power structure, they are regarded as disloyal by the 
people they seek to represent, and hence anti-social.  
Second, we can evaluate whether a bandit is stationary or roving. Following Olson, 
this depends on their level of investment in the community. Bandit organizations that take a 
long-term and encompassing interest are regarded as stationary bandits, whereas those who 
only take a short-term interest are considered roving.  
Combining these two dimensions yield four perspectives or ways of seeing the 
organizational bandit (see Figure One). These are not static types of bandits defined by 
essential qualities. Rather, we emphasize the shifting perceptions of the target audience; the 
same bandit organization might be portrayed in all four ways by the same or different 
audiences over time. We do this because organizational legitimacy too is audience-specific 
(Suchman, 1995) and thus better suits addressing our research question. 
The first way we might see the bandit is as hero. Here the organizational bandit is 
considered resolutely against the official power holders of society. Its ‘social’ character is 
derived from the ability to capture and express the discontent experienced by its audience. 
Typically, this would comprise of socio-economically disadvantaged groups who feel 
abandoned or oppressed by dominant institutions. From this perspective, the bandit 
organization represents a material and symbolic gesture towards community welfare and 
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justice. For example, vigilante groups in Mexico like Autodefensa who have taken up arms 
against drug cartels are often seen from this viewpoint. Autodefensa are considered rebuilders 
of society by Michoacán locals, frequently deploying extra-judicial violence in a manner that 
pits them not so much against the cartels (i.e., the Knights Templar) but the Mexican nation-
state itself (BBC, 2015, also see Bakker [2015] and Vaccaro & Palazzo [2015] for other 
analyses of vigilantism).  
A second lens through which we might view the bandit organization is as autocrat. 
Contrary to the hero, this bandit is closely aligned with official institutions, and hence anti-
social in Hobsbawm’s terminology. Meanwhile, they are assumed to have a long-term 
interest in the community, making them stationary in Olson’s (2000) framework. For 
example, the Russian mafia are considered bandits by many Russians, almost functioning as 
an informal arm of the nation-state (Volkov, 2002). Their community interests are 
‘encompassing’ as they exploit their stationary position in society. In contrast to Hobsbawm’s 
social definition of the bandit, Volkov (2002: 59) suggests that “current Russian usage refers 
to the stationary urban bandit well integrated into commercial activity but armed and always 
ready to resort to violence”.  
The third way bandit organizations can be seen are as marauders. These organizations 
are not strictly acting on behalf of the people. Marauders are opportunistic, self-interested and 
behave in an ad hoc fashion. They have no long-term interest in the community and exploit 
power vacuums and ambiguities to make a profit. In this respect, they are anti-social and 
roving. For example, people smugglers (not to be confused with ‘people traffickers’) are 
likely to be seen as marauders, having no long-term relationship with their audience and thus 
anti-social in nature. They adapt to changing geopolitical situations, constantly seeking to 
exploit financial opportunities as they provide ‘services’ to communities who feel abandoned 
by the official authorities (UNODC, 2015). 
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Seeing the bandit organization as rebel is the fourth perspective. The impertinent 
rebel organization is not driven by long-term relationships. They unpredictably move out of 
the shadows of mainstream society, engage and then retreat. These organizations rove. 
Nevertheless, rebel bandits still display a distinct social element because they are perceived to 
hold values opposing the official establishment. In an abstract sense at least, these bandit 
organizations visibly side with the oppressed against a perceived oppressor. Hence, rebels are 
both roving and social. A good example is the hacker group Anonymous. While acting 
outside the law, they are regarded by some as ethical crusaders who have declared war 
against various contemporary evils, whether Western Corporations or the Islamic State 
(Coleman, 2015).                                 
 
                                ================================ 
INSERT FIGURE ONE ABOUT HERE 
          ================================ 
 
Bandits and Organizational Legitimacy 
 There is no question that bandit organizations are deemed illegitimate by the 
dominant and official establishments they flout. And we suggest this appraisal is quietly 
mirrored in studies about how criminal organizations function, especially in sociologies of 
deviance. However, it is difficult to imagine bandits (like the Shower Posse) thriving on sheer 
violence alone given how their constituents evidently see them, partially at least, as desirable 
and acceptable actors in the community.  
 What do we mean by legitimacy and can it be theorized in relation to bandit 
organizations? To help frame this question, Suchman’s (1995) influential paper on the topic 
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is a useful starting point. Organization legitimacy is defined as “a generalized perception or 
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper or appropriate within some 
socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions” (Suchman, 1995: 574). 
Suchman is keen to highlight how organizational legitimacy is socially constructed rather 
than a natural attribute of institutions. This makes the socio-cultural context crucial since 
legitimacy is dependent on what he terms an ‘audience’s’ changeable perceptions.  
 According to Suchman (1995), legitimacy can be managed in three ways. 
Organizations might generate creditability by either conforming to the dictates of a pre-
existing audience, select (from multiple options) an audience more likely to give support or 
manipulate its environment to create new and favourable audiences. However, not all types 
of organizational legitimacy are the same. Suchman presents three types. The first he terms 
pragmatic legitimacy, which “rests on the self-interested calculations of an organization’s 
most immediate audiences” (Suchman, 1995: 578) so that the organization is perceived as 
indispensable for securing particular objectives. This entails an exchange or transactional 
relationship and depends on the organization’s capacity to influence the wider environment to 
help its audience achieve specific goals.     
 Moral legitimacy is the second type. It “rests not on judgments about whether a given 
activity benefits the evaluator, but rather on judgments about whether the activity is ‘the right 
thing to do.’ These judgments, in turn, usually reflect beliefs about whether the activity 
effectively promotes societal welfare, as defined by the audience’s socially constructed value 
system” (Suchman, 1995: 579). This kind of legitimacy has four further subcategories related 
to the “prosocial logic” (Suchman, 1995: 579) that underpins it. Organizations with moral 
legitimacy rely on a positive evaluation of a). ‘outputs and consequences’ (the social effects 
of its activities), b). ‘techniques and procedures’ (how it arranges its practical routines), c). 
‘categories and structures’ (the overall purpose and role the organization plays in the 
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community) and d). ‘leaders and representativeness’ (the charismatic goodwill and gravitas of 
an idiosyncratic overseer).    
 The third type is cognitive legitimacy, which rests on the “acceptance of the 
organization as necessary or inevitable based on some taken-for-granted cultural account” 
(Suchman, 1995: 582). When an organization builds this kind of legitimacy it is simply 
“unthinkable” (Suchman, 1995: 583) to imagine life without it. Cognitive legitimacy further 
consists of ‘comprehensibility’ (whereby its narrative is so plausible that the audience fear 
disruptive chaos without the organization) and ‘taken-for-grantedness’ (where the 
organization simply becomes part of the general order of things).   
   Suchman’s (1995) framework is persuasive and provides a useful entry point for 
theorizing how bandit organizations build legitimacy. Especially pertinent is the suggestion 
that legitimacy “reflects a congruence between the behaviours of the legitimated entity and 
the shared (or assumedly shared) beliefs of some social group” (Suchman, 1995: 574). Is it 
reasonable to expect bandit organizations to garner such legitimacy in their social network? 
Clearly there is one complication here. Suchman (1995) never considers the legitimacy of 
organizations that are officially judged felonious. Hence our objective. Bandit organizations 
clearly build impressive levels of legitimacy among certain audiences. How exactly do they 
do this and what are the implications for organization studies?  
A BANDIT ORGANIZATION IN JAMACIA – THE CASE OF CHRISTOPHER 
COKE AND THE ‘SHOWER POSSE’ 
 
To address this question we explore an illustrative case of the Jamaican drug cartel 
Shower Posse and its leader Christopher ‘Dudus’ Coke. We chose this example because it (a) 
demonstrates what Hobsbawm regards as a bandit (in both the social and anti-social 
meanings of the term); (b) evidences both stationary and roving bandit characteristics as 
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described by Olson (2000); and (c) provides an overt or ‘extreme case’ (Flyvbjerg, 2006) of 
legitimacy building, making it easier to observe the processes involved.  
We identified approximately 85 newspaper articles, reports (including film/TV 
documentaries) and scholarly sources that discuss Christopher Coke and the Shower Posse. 
For obvious reasons, most reports emerged after the dramatic arrest of Coke. Using our 
theory as a guide, we manually coded these data along four preset criteria: 1). relevant 
background information, 2). ‘ways of seeing’ the bandit, 3). evidence of organizational 
legitimacy (or otherwise) and 4). internal organizational processes underlying the cartel. We 
present the data chronologically to give a more nuanced idea of how significant events 
unfolded.        
 Regarding the fourth coding criteria - internal organizational processes - little 
information was available about the management structures used by the Shower Posse 
organization (e.g., membership roles, strategy, logistics, accounting systems, etc.). Moreover, 
and as we shall soon note, its organizational boundaries are often difficult to discern. The 
Shower Posse’s ‘business model’ overlapped with legitimate enterprises in the financial and 
construction industries among others. This could make it a kind of ‘partial organization’ 
(Ahrne and Brunsson, 2010) or a ‘network organization’ (Borgatti and Foster, 2003; 
Thompson, 2003) whereby functions are internally missing, distributed or outsourced to 
legitimate concerns. Even some years after Coke’s incarceration, forensic investigators 
admitted that unraveling exactly how the organization functioned has proved “extremely 
complex and challenging in light of the fact that Coke had legitimate income through 
businesses that he operated” (Jamaica Gleaner, 2014). Nevertheless, we do know that the 
Shower Posse was widely considered a distinct ‘organizational entity’ in Jamaica and US 
(Economist, 2012), with Coke as its chairman. And we can infer some rough contours of this 
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organizational form based on the legitimacy building techniques it developed to render itself 
‘comprehensible’ (Suchman, 1995) to its audience, an issue we return to later.      
 
The Making of a Drug ‘Don’ – the Neo-liberalization of Jamaica 
 
By the late 1990s Jamaica had become a central trafficking nodal point for narcotics 
bound from Latin and South America to the U.S. This occurred almost simultaneously with 
the dismantling of its ‘socialist state’ as trade liberalization and IMF loan conditions sought 
to stem economic recession (Gray, 2004). When Jamaica gained independence from the UK 
in 1962, the economy expanded rapidly with an annual growth rate of 3% from 1960 to 1972, 
fuelled by foreign direct investment in the bauxite and aluminium industries. However, the 
country was extremely vulnerable to import and export fluctuations, and displayed the classic 
symptoms of a dependence economy with vast income inequalities (Huber & Stephens, 
1992). 
In 1972, Michael Manley, the socialist leader of the People’s National Party (PNP), 
was elected Prime Minister. Under his leadership, the PNP initiated a five-goal socio-
economic strategy based on democratic socialism. It sought to a). reduce international 
economic dependence through trade diversification, b). create a mixed economy with the 
state playing a leading role, c). extend social equality, d). deepen democratic institutions, and 
f). promote a foreign policy based on cooperation between Third World countries, especially 
Cuba (Huber & Stephens, 1992). By introducing a new levy on the bauxite companies, the 
government’s revenues increased sevenfold, making it possible to make extensive 
investments in health, housing, education and literacy improvement. 
By the mid-1975, the economy began to stagnate and in 1976 Manley began 
negotiations with the IMF to receive financial support. The 1978 IMF agreement carried strict 
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austerity conditions (Huber & Stephens, 1992). While the PNP had decided to abandon their 
democratic-socialist agenda and implement neoliberal economic reforms, they repeatedly 
failed to meet the targets set by the IMF. In late 1979 the government decided to reject IMF 
conditions entirely because, as Manley explained, the party “was not prepared to accept a 
path that meant greater hardship for the working people without offering any hope of their 
future well-being” (PNP 1980, 2, as cited in, Wilson, 1996).  
Michael Manley and the PNP lost the 1980 election to Edward Seaga, leader of the 
Jamaican Labor Party or JLP. Seaga, who was more sympathetic to the IMF and the World 
Bank, sought to “create a market system of economics and shift unnecessary public 
enterprises to the private sector... [and the] progressive liberalization of import restrictions 
leading eventually to the elimination of all licensing requirements” (Mills 1989, 386, cited in 
Wilson, 1996). With U.S foreign policy exerting influence on the country during this period 
(they had no desire to see another Cuba emerging), the Jamaican state drastically reduced 
spending in public health, law and order, transport and education, prompting a wave of mass 
strikes and social unrest in 1985 (Wilson, 1996).  
When Michael Manley was re-elected in 1989, his PNP bore little resemblance to the 
socialist party it was during the 1970s. He intensified the neoliberal policies that had been 
launched by Seaga (Wilson, 1996). This included the dramatic deregulation of the economy 
and the removal of food subsidies and exchange controls. Closely overseen by the IMF, the 
state’s role in the economy was also reduced, divesting 90% of its public spending in only 
three years (Wilson, 1996). According to Manley, the “private sector operating in market 
conditions provides the best means of economic growth and development” (Jamaica Outlook, 
1991: 2).  
As foreign corporations took advantage of deregulation, especially in the mining 
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industry, there was also a noticeable rise in organized crime, slowly emerging as an economic 
and political force in the 1980s. By the mid-1990s a number of cartels had considerably 
strengthened their influence (Gray, 2004; Johnson and Soeters, 2008). This was precipitated 
by three factors.  
First, the immensely unpopular IMF policies meant that the two major political parties 
had to solicit support from criminal leaders to gain votes from the ghettos. Politicians became 
more reliant on community leaders, or ‘Dons’, to win over these districts (Gray, 2004).  
Second, the collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in Cuban economic aid immediately 
ceasing. As result, governmental spending ceased too. A power vacuum opened in the heart 
of Jamaican society and wealthy drug ‘Dons’ swiftly filled it, including neighbourhood 
governance roles. As the economy floundered and state budgets cut, the state began to rely on 
these dons to provide basic services to poorer districts (Johnson & Soeters, 2008).  
And third, the U.S ‘war on drugs’ escalated during the Clinton administration. 
Traditional trafficking routes were more tightly policed. Columbian narcotic producers thus 
required alternative intermediary organizations to deliver its produce to the U.S market, and 
Jamaica was ideal for political, economic and geographical reasons.      
Against this backdrop stands the rising prominence of the drug ‘Don’ Christopher 
Coke and his Shower Posse cartel. It is tempting to conceptualize Coke as a ‘deviant 
entrepreneur’ (Gilman, et al., 2011) or even ‘rouge leader’ (Johnson & Soeters, 2008). But 
these terms carry the restrictive biases that mar deviance studies, making it difficult to 
theorizing organizational legitimacy. So we propose instead that the Shower Posse is better 
understood as a bandit organization. Indeed, what made the cartel so remarkable was its overt 
provision of public services, including civic infrastructure, healthcare and education. As a 
Jamaican journalist put it, “where the government has failed the people, he [Coke] has filled 
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the gap” (Annu, 2010).  
 
The Rise and Fall of Christopher Coke 
 
Christopher Coke made international headlines in May 2010. After almost one year of 
intense political pressure from the Obama administration, the Jamaican government, then led 
by Prime Minister Bruce Golding of the JLP, reluctantly agreed to extradite Coke. Obama 
demanded the extradition in order to demonstrate Jamaica’s commitment to combatting drug 
trafficking. Mexico was by then a lost cause. But Jamaican could still be reined in. 
Apprehending the leader of the Shower Posse would be no easy task given the fierce loyalty 
he inspired in Tivoli Gardens. A month of violence followed, resulting in 74 civilian deaths. 
Coke was finally captured attempting to leave the country using an Afro-American wig as a 
disguise (a backup pink wig was also recovered from the get-away-car). He was sentenced to 
23 years in a New York Federal Prison for drug trafficking.    
Christopher Coke was born in 1969 and raised in Tivoli Gardens, a garrison 
community built just a few years prior to his birth. The district was redeveloped in the early 
1960s to replace the notorious Back-O-Wall district, known for its deplorable standards (no 
plumbing and two bathrooms serving 5,000 residents). The idea was to plan a neighbourhood 
“befitting of decent human beings” (Jamaica Observer, 2004). Coke’s father was the leader 
of the Shower Posse organization during this period. He controlled Tivoli Gardens with fear 
and was suspected of over a thousand murders in the U.S. during the 1980s.  
After his father’s unexplained death while being extradited to the U.S (he was burnt 
alive in a small prison cell), the 22-year old Christopher Coke inherited the organization. He 
quickly expanded the business internationally and started to make significant investments 
towards rebuilding the much-neglected Tivoli Gardens. The Shower Posse was highly 
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organized and frequently described as a major conglomerate in Jamaican society (France 24, 
2010). Some even depicted it as a “state within a state, allocating benefits, defending borders 
and extracting taxes” (Schwartz, 2011). From 2001 onwards the “Jamaican police had not 
been able to enter the neighbourhood without his permission” (Schwartz, 2013). Like other 
major drug cartels, Coke also managed mainstream businesses, including his ‘Incomparable 
Enterprise’ construction firm, allowing him to develop alliances with government officials to 
help assist the Shower Posse’s illicit commercial ventures (Schwartz, 2012). 
Coke’s multi-billion dollar crime organization benefited from the changing socio-
economic conditions in Jamaica. The wave of economic deregulation in the early 1990s 
triggered a dramatic expansion of banking institutions that operated under limited state 
control. Financialization of the Jamaican economy was essential to cartels seeking to launder 
massive revenues and diversify their operations. As a result, the line between legitimate and 
illegitimate businesses activities were considerably blurred. Moreover, the war on drugs, now 
fought by U.S. president Bill Clinton, continued to escalate prices. Millions of U.S dollars 
were now being collected by the Shower Posse on a weekly basis.   
 The alarming decline in living standards that followed the IMF intervention in 
Jamaica permitted Coke to deepen his organization’s power and legitimacy in the 1990s: “the 
Don became an even more important figure in the mid-1990s when Jamaica was going 
through one of its most challenging economic periods” (Campbell, 2011). In the garrison 
communities, residents now received little or no assistance from the state. Now they relied 
solely on its leaders for support. Over time the people of Tivoli Gardens viewed the Shower 
Posse as a central moral authority, an organization they could depend upon for a normal way 
of life.  
 Governmental corruption was also part of Coke’s success. In the context of a near 
bankrupted state, political parties relied on Coke for votes, grass-roots creditability and the 
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provision of social services. This connection was absolutely instrumental to Coke, not only 
because it greatly facilitated his drug enterprise, but it also helped him receive lucrative 
government contracts for his legitimate network of firms (France 24, 2010).  
After winning the 2007 election, Bruce Golding forged strong bonds with the Coke’s 
organization. It might seem surprising that a state official would do this, but there was a long 
standing relationship between the JLP and the Coke family. For example, Edward Seaga was 
so close to Lester Coke that he even marched in his funeral procession after Coke-senior 
mysteriously died under house arrest (Schwartz, 2011).  
This relationship between JLP and Tivoli Gardens would be put to the test in 2009 
when the U.S. authorities began to pressure the Golding government to extradite Coke. 
Golding deliberately protracted the proceedings and employed a U.S. lobbying firm to 
influence key politicians to oppose the extradition order (Eggen, 2010). When he finally 
submitted and Coke was finally extradited to the U.S, Golding immediately resigned (New 
York Times, 2011).  
 
 
The Responsibilities of a ‘Chief Welfare Officer’ 
 
A major reason for the violent resistance to Coke’s extradition was the proactive role 
his organization had in rebuilding Tivoli Gardens after years of economic neglect. It is here 
that the Shower Posse organization complicates the stereotypical image of a thuggish drug 
cartel and can be seen as a bandit organization. In a handwritten letter to the Manhattan court 
trying him, Coke requested leniency: “I was involved in community development, where I 
implemented a lot of social programs … I did a lot of charitable deeds and social services to 
help members of my community. I also hosted a lot of charity events for the elderly in my 
community” (Pilkington, 2012). Although conceding that Coke “did good things”, Judge 
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Robert P. Patterson nevertheless insisted, “the conduct charged was of such a bad nature that 
it offsets the good” (Schwartz, 2012). 
Coke’s statements could easily be dismissed as a desperate attempt by a violent 
criminal to gain clemency. And they probably were in part. However, it has been well 
documented that his organization was extremely dedicated to the garrison population’s 
wellbeing. Somewhat ironically, the public service that generated Coke the most loyalty was 
law and order. The juridical system in Tivoli Gardens was simply known as “the system”, 
involving magistrates and jails (Schwartz, 2011). The penal code sort to curb crimes that had 
become rampant in the post-Manley years: robbing, homicide and rape. According to a 
leaked cable from the U.S. embassy in Kingston, Desmond McKenzie, then Mayor of 
Kingston, “worked with Coke to reduce crime in the inner cities of Jamaica, particularly in 
West Kingston”. It was also revealed in the same memo that the ruling party, JLP, heavily 
relied on Coke to maintain civil calm: “If he now were extradited, this would ‘leave a 
vacuum,’ and matters would be much worse” (Guardian, 2010). 
The justice met out by Coke’s organization was ruthless: “teenage thieves had one 
hand broken, rapists were beaten, and anyone foolish enough to persistently dissent was 
exiled or killed” (Schwartz, 2011). However, contrary to the state-run legal institutions, 
which for good reason were considered corrupt (Fahim, 2010), Coke’s “system” was widely 
effective. News reports are clearly confused by this unexpected poverty/crimelessness 
couplet when discussing Tivoli Gardens: “rape and burglary were said to be rare … and 
police statistics suggest it has one of the lowest crime rates in Kingston and the surrounding 
area” (Davis, 2012).  
The Shower Posse provided other state-like services. Public schools and health clinics 
were funded by drug money (Annu, 2010; France 24, 2010). According to one report, 
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Christopher Coke was perceived as “a one-man welfare state for the impoverished 
neighborhoods of West Kingston” (Ronzoni, 2010). Furthermore: 
 
 …Christopher ‘Dudus’ Coke was seen by the poor as the head of the shadow parallel 
government which met their immediate demands for food, shelter and education for 
their children. He thus became their godfather who provided for them in times of crisis 
and need and thus creating a situation where they would be willing to confront the 
forces of the oppressor - the government of Jamaica (Sierra Herald, 2011). 
 
The Shower Posse’s welfare system spanned from basic philanthropy to socially 
responsible commercial activities, like “micro loans” to kick-start small businesses and 
medicare services (Schwartz, 2011; Fahim, 2010).  
A good example of Coke’s social investment programme was the “Presidential Click” 
organization. The Shower Posse worked closely with numerous reggae artists to rebuild the 
ailing industry after major Western record labels decamped following Bob Marley’s death. 
Presidential Click Corp clearly spotted an investment opportunity. Aging (but internationally 
popular) reggae stars were supported. Untested talent was strongly encouraged. The 
worldwide popular Rastafarian “slackness” musical genre came to age during this period 
(Campbell, 2011).   
President Click sponsored two annual concerts in Tivoli Gardens. The charity show 
‘Champions in Action’ and the free pre-Christmas extravaganza ‘West Kingston Jamboree’. 
Both featured some of the biggest names in reggae (Meschino, 2010). This is perhaps why 
one local resident described Coke in the following terms: “He’s the chief welfare officer. It’s 
the unwritten contract between the don and the Jamaican political system” (Campbell, 2011). 
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 Delivering these social services was motivated by self-interested insofar as it 
strengthened Coke’s control over the district, maintaining favorable relations with the 
government and cooperation among community members to further his criminal 
organization. However, the extent to which Coke invested in social programmes repeatedly 
surpassed these instrumental concerns, often astonishing governmental officials (Ronzoni, 
2010; Schwartz, 2011). A genuine commitment to civic wellbeing was important to Coke’s 
business empire, to the point where he even discouraged Tivoli youth from entering his 
trafficking industry. As one boy reported to the BBC, “He (Coke) made sure I stayed out of 
trouble and paid for my schooling … he was even going to pay for me to go to pilot school” 
(Davis, 2012).  
 Commentators have also noted how these activities were promoted by a strong 
commitment to the black power movement, liberation theology and particularly radical 
Marxism. In other words, Coke had a political agenda . During his extensive travel abroad he 
was exposed to a variety of political ideologies that were hostile to the commercial currents 
of global capitalism (Gray, 2004). Dons like Coke acquired a renewed urgency about poverty 
and its causes, which curiously interconnected with their criminal activities and an aggressive 
view of a customer-base: white upper middle-class Americans (Gray, 2004). This added a 
strong emancipatory impetus to their activities, an appeal to universal principles of justice. As 
Gray argues in relation to Kingston’s urban poor that idolized Christopher Coke:  
 
World historical ideologies such as liberalism, Black Nationalism, Marxism, and ideas 
of freedom and individual rights radiated in the ghetto with probably more intensity 




After Coke was extradited to the U.S. and sentenced to prison, Tivoli Gardens once 
again became one of the most violent and impoverished garrison districts in Jamaica, if not 
the Caribbean (Fahim, 2010). Upon sentencing, a number of reggae artists recorded songs in 
honor of their “president”. Most famous was Bunny Wailer, a founding member of the 
Wailers alongside Bob Marley. His song, “Don’t touch the President”, described Coke as a 
“Robin Hood from the neighborhood”. In Wailer’s words: “Dudus is a man of peace who 
makes sure people in his Tivoli Gardens community don’t commit crimes”. 
 
DISCUSSION: HOW IS BANDIT LEGITIMACY ORGANIZED? 
We propose that Coke and the Shower Posse represents a bandit organization because 
they functioned outside (or against) the law but occupied a positon within the practical and 
moral economy of Tivoli Gardens and beyond.  
The case tells us that organizational legitimacy was central to this awkward 
positioning. Unlike most formal organizations, which are legally and socially sanctioned by 
their political context, bandit organizations derive legitimacy in a negative manner, by 
pointing out deficiencies of the state, the IMF and other putatively legitimate institutions. 
Credibility is built by demonstrating how the bandit can remedy this perceived deficit. Even 
though theft and violence are integral to the bandit organization, their legitimacy succeeds (or 
fails) in relation to a dominant institutional ‘other’ and the ability to be perceived as remedial 
force. In this respect the bandit is symbolically reliant on the same official order it ostensibly 
seeks to reject. 
However, more detail is required to fully grasp this legitimacy building process. To 
this end it might be useful to revisit both Suchman’s (1995) theory and the four ‘ways of 
seeing’ bandits organization discussed earlier (see Figure One). We remind the reader that we 
do not treat the bandit as a static and fixed ‘type’ since legitimacy is contingent on audience 
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perceptions. They can shift and change, as the rise and fall of Christopher Coke and the 
Shower Posse clearly demonstrates.  
Bandit Organization as Hero 
 Recall that the ‘heroic’ bandit organization is considered stationary (rather than 
roving) and pro-social by their audience. They are, so to speak, ‘for the people’. From this 
perspective the bandit organization attempts to build legitimacy by fostering the perception 
that they are rectifying a public goods deficit based on community norms. Therefore, 
Suchman’s (1995) category of moral legitimacy is most relevant here. It derives from an 
audience’s judgement about whether the bandit’s “activities promotes societal welfare, as 
defined by the audience’s socially constructed value system” (Suchman, 1995: 579). The 
bandit becomes, to quote one description of Christopher Coke, the ‘chief welfare officer’. 
 Coke rose to prominence when the IMF-led government imposed harsh austerity 
measures, creating crippling levels of poverty in garrison communities like Tivoli Gardens. 
While Christopher Coke was allegedly proficient at taking life (especially in the U.S), the 
Shower Posse also sought to secure life in the ghetto by supporting schools, health clinics, 
entertainment events and parks. What the state could not provide, the Shower Posse did by 
engendering what Suchman (1995) calls ‘consequential legitimacy’ (e.g., improved physical 
health) and ‘procedural legitimacy’ (e.g., public dialogue and community forums). And given 
Coke’s charismatic leadership style, ‘personal legitimacy’ (Suchman, 1995) must have also 
played a significant role.  
Bandit Organization as Autocrat 
 From this perspective, Coke’s bandit organization is viewed as stationary and 
displaying strong anti-social tendencies. Recall that by anti-social we mean the bandit is 
perceived to be more aligned with the dominant power structure (the state in this case) than 
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the local people. Similar to the Italian mafia (see Nuzzi, 2012; Gambetta, 1993; 1995) and 
gangster capitalists (Woodiwiss, 2005), this way of seeing bandit organizations emphasizes 
their authoritarian techniques for maintaining order and stability, reducing uncertainty so that 
its business dealings remain undisturbed. Against the law, but aloof and frequently rumoured 
to attend official banquets and state ceremonies as they display their under-class credentials. 
In the case of Christopher Coke, he resided in a very affluent district of Kingston and not 
Tivoli Gardens. The Shower Posse also enjoyed strong connections with 
governmental/corporate elites. Strangely, this distance helped fuel Christopher Coke’s 
prophet-like status among the more ordinary citizens of the neighbourhood.    
According to this standpoint, the Shower Posse builds legitimacy by fostering the 
perception that a governmental deficit is being rectified. This bandit organization behaved as 
a state within a state, maintaining law, order and justice in a brutal fashion. But compared to 
the rampant crime that once prevailed, this safety mandate made everyday life much easier 
and thus generated loyalty and legitimacy in Tivoli Gardens. This is how the Shower Posse 
became famous for reducing violence and petty crime to levels unseen for generations. These 
activities were morally and pragmatically important, but Suchman’s (1995) concept of 
cognitive legitimacy is perhaps more apt in this respect. The background stability of everyday 
life in Tivoli Gardens made the Shower Posses’ organizational dominance comprehensible 
(e.g., Tivoli would descend into chaos without them) and taken-for-granted (e.g., the smooth 
and safe reproduction of everyday life with Christopher Coke as protector).  
Bandit Organization as Marauder  
    Recall that the marauding bandit organization is anti-social, exploiting gaps and/or 
alliances with the dominant system for instrumental gain. The people smuggler, for example, 
is detached from their audience and in no way seeks to be identified with them. And they are 
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roving rather than stationary, intermittingly visiting a community to tax or plunder, and then 
move on. They exhibit no ‘encompassing interest’ (Olson, 2000) in their audience.     
 We suggest that Christopher Coke and the Shower Posse gang may be viewed from 
this less romantic perspective too, given that the banditry was only nominally based in and 
around Tivoli Gardens. As a roving bandit Coke appears to have been skilful at moving in 
and out of different socio-political spheres, including the state, licit business concerns, the 
international cartel network and, of course, the Tivoli Garden ghetto. Coke routinely travelled 
to the US where his enterprise had important business interests, both legal and illegal, and 
was always on the move to avoid assassination from competing ‘Dons’. Moreover, reports 
highlight how the law and order meted out by the Shower Posse could be capricious, 
unpredictable and frequently gratuitous.  
However, despite the erratic violence, Coke and his bandit organization did provide 
instrumental opportunities for an impoverished community that would have been otherwise 
impossible to access. This is why a visit from the Shower Posses inspired both fear and 
anticipation. With the Shower Posses’ support, one could get things done in Tivoli Gardens 
and beyond. From this perspective, Christopher Coke attempted to cultivate pragmatic 
legitimacy. For Suchman (1995: 578) this “rests on the self-interested calculations of an 
organization’s most immediate audiences”, and is largely transactional, as witnessed by the 
micro-loans, career support, debt-collection services and other pragmatic accomplishments 
provided by the often absent ‘Don’. Actively accepting the criminal organization’s 
supremacy was the price for such opportunity access.   
We suggest this kind of legitimacy depended upon fostering the perception that an 
opportunity deficit was being rectified in Tivoli Gardens, casting the state as pragmatically 
incapable of achieving instrumental and self-interested objectives. Moreover, the state itself 
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might be an audience in this respect too. Christopher Coke clearly convinced successive 
governments that he was indispensable for securing votes, maintaining law and order and 
deterring aggression towards state officials. This accounts for the paradoxical relationship 
Coke had with the government. He was an anti-state outlaw that sought to be perceived as a 
remedial force. However, the Shower Posse had no interest in overthrowing or replacing the 
state, since only through its weaknesses and deficiencies could it leverage transactional 
power. Ironically, this marauding bandit organization needed the state, albeit in an atrophied 
and rundown condition.     
Bandit Organization as Rebel              
From this perspective the bandit organization is roving, prosocial and closely 
identifies with their audience and vice versa. The rebel is characterized by moving attacks 
against the dominant power structure and seeks to stay true to an abstract social justice ideal. 
Seeing Christopher Coke and the Shower Posse from this perspective would highlight how 
the organization was motivated - in part at least - by political principles associated with anti-
globalization and post-colonial justice claims in Jamaica. In this respect, Coke plays the role 
of the avenger, seeking retribution for the death of his father in US-sponsored custody and the 
systematic impoverishment of Tivoli Gardens following the neo-liberalization of the 
Jamaican economy. Bandit legitimacy is organized by the perception that it is rectifying an 
ethical deficit in relation to certain universal ideals; in this case Black Nationalism, liberation 
theology and Third World Marxism. 
This represents the most romantic version of Coke and his bandit organization. 
Manipulating the hypocritical moral arbitrage in relation to the U.S. (since it represented both 
a customer and threat in the ‘war on drugs’ environment), Coke turns the tables on the 
authorities, becoming a globetrotting freedom fighter, a kind of Bob Marley-inspired noble 
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robber who has underground connections with other resistance movements (especially in 
South America). But what kind of legitimacy is being built here? Returning to Suchman 
(1995), not pragmatic legitimacy because the concerns with Black Nationalism, for example, 
appear to be non-transactional. And cognitive legitimacy is not sourced here since the Shower 
Posse are professing to disrupt and subvert the status quo rather than render it taken for 
granted. Moral legitimacy comes closer. However, the emancipatory objectives espoused by 
the Coke organization were not in the name of an immediate public good but an abstract 
ideal. In this light it resembles more a political social movement than a philanthropic 
organization that merely delivers local welfare.  
Perhaps we need to extend Suchman’s (1995) model and add ethical legitimacy when 
discussing the bandit organization as rebel. Abstract ideals related to freedom and justice are 
drawn upon. From an external perspective, including most notably the U.S Justice 
Department, this type of bandit legitimacy is the most difficult to comprehend. The message 
of universal freedom and social justice seems to be at such odds with behaviour that 




 This paper has sought not only to place criminal organizations – some of which are 
international in scope – under the spotlight for analysis, but initiate a scholarly conversation 
about how some build legitimacy. This is an important but difficult task given the “yuck 
factor” (Gilman et al., 2011: 14) involved. By developing the bandit organization concept and 
a perspectival method for studying them, we have intended to extend knowledge about 
organizational legitimacy to institutions that are often dismissed as illegitimate by default. 
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But clearly much remains to be done in terms of fully understanding the complexities that 
arise from our analysis. In moving forward, we envisage a number of avenues for future 
research concerning bandit organizations.  
First, we now know that different ways of seeing the bandit organization informs their 
organizational legitimacy. But what determines whether one perspective dominates over the 
others? The audience and its expectations? Changing socio-political circumstances? 
Preferences of the bandit organization itself since it may be selective, as Suchman (1995) 
argues? And can these various ways of seeing bandit organization overlap, complement or 
contradict each other? Relatedly, it is reasonable to assume more than one bandit organization 
occupying a single territory. How do they compete for legitimacy and how does a 
competitor’s presence figure into the legitimation process? 
Second, how can our theory of bandit organizations be used to study similar outlaw 
organizations like WikiLeaks or the Animal Liberation Front? Generalizability is always 
problematic when theorizing from an ‘extreme case’ like ours. However, we believe that our 
four ways of seeing the bandit may help in this regard, since audience perceptions are what 
count rather than the objective deeds of the bandit itself. Any organization that is outside the 
law yet attracts conspicuously levels of trust and acceptability from an audience can be 
examined using our framework. This might even hold the key for those investigating 
organizations that seemingly defy common sense. Rather than depict terrorist groups as 
“death cults” (as the Islamic State has), for example, our framework might provide a more 
nuanced understanding of how they persist despite their ghastly nature. Regardless, we 
encourage fellow researchers to test and explore our argument in other settings to evaluate its 
reliability.         
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Third, as mentioned earlier, we have little data regarding the internal processes and 
structures of the Shower Posse bandit organization. Did it cohere around a holistic set of 
functions similar to mainstream organizations or was it more fragmented and distributed? 
Ahrne and Brunsson’s (2010) distinction between ‘complete’ and ‘partial’ organizations 
might for future research about the nature of bandit organizations, especially in relation to 
legitimacy. Partial organizations are missing the completeness (in terms of stable functions, 
processes and isolatable staff) of formal organizations, and thus represent ‘organization 
outside of organizations’. Ahrne and Brunsson (2010) explore this concept in relation to 
emergent firms in the global economy. It might also be useful to explore organizational 
practices in the shadow economy, especially bandit organizations. And if they do exhibit 
characteristics of structural partiality, does this enable or hinder the legitimacy building 
processes given the multiple communities or audiences that may be involved? 
 Fourth, using the idea of the bandit organization to gain a better understanding of 
legitimacy requires a temporal dimension that is not fully developed in our paper. It is easy to 
present a rather teleological narrative about the rise (and fall) of bandit organizations such as 
the Shower Posse. But given their dependence on changeable sources of legitimacy, there are 
no doubt other cases of false starts (delegitimization), shifting alliances (partial-
legitimization) and changing audience perceptions (renewed legitimization) that unfold over 
time. We would learn much by examining those instances in where legitimacy failed apropos 
the bandit organization, as done in other organizational fields (see Schouten & Glasbergen, 
2011; Castello, Etter, & Nielsen, 2016; Ehrstöm-Fuentes, 2016). Moreover, our approach 
might shed light on those curious examples where bandit organizations have transitioned into 
mainstream ones. The Mahdi Army in Iraq changed from a murderous outlaw group during 
the US invasion to an armed community support movement (i.e., providing electricity and 
sewage facilities). It then developed enough mainstream legitimacy to contemplate 
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involvement in the 2005 elections. Sinn Féin, the political arm of the Irish Republican 
Army, was closely allied with anti-British armed militancy in the 1920s. Then the 
organization moved to the political left in the 1960s and developed an advanced social 
welfare agenda. Today it is part of the mainstream political establishment. In what ways can 
the concept of the bandit organization shed light on the processes behind these transitions? 
 Fifth, the Christopher Coke case indicates that bandit organizations foster a specific 
perception of the political and economic establishment – as illegitimate – to build their own 
flows of loyalty. They provide what the establishment cannot. However, we noted how Coke 
also had concrete connections with the state (e.g., election support) and mainstream business 
firms (e.g., in relation to his construction enterprise). Similar to the Italian Mafia (see 
Champeyrache, 2014), this tells us that bandits may also build legitimacy by cultivating close 
ties with official institutions. For example, in relation to the Iraqi Mahdi Army mentioned 
above, they became extremely popular with the Iraqi Police Force (trained and sponsored by 
Western Coalition Forces) before flirting with more mainstream institutions associated with 
the US-installed government. By 2008 they had lost favour with all stakeholders, even in 
their local Shia communities, and were disbanded (only to be reborn in 2014 as a ‘Peace 
Brigade’ to fight the Islamic State of Iraqi and the Levant) alongside the mainstream (and US 
supported) Iraqi Army. Future research might endeavour to better understand how bandit 
organizations form field level interdependencies with mainstream organizations. And for 
obvious reasons, this may be of interest to public sector corruption studies too.  
 Finally, by attempting to move beyond the biases underlying the social sciences when 
considering so-called ‘deviant organizations’, we have also learnt a good deal about our own 
as middle class Western biases. So much research in organization studies – including our own 
we admit –focus only on mainstream ‘legitimate’ organizational forms, assuming that these 
are the only ones that really matter in the global economy. Along with a small but growing 
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number of other researchers in the field (e.g., Parker, 2008, 2011: Crane, 2013; Schoeneborn 
and Scherer, 2012), we hope our paper will encourage scholars to study organizations that are 
seldom mentioned in business schools. For sure, while it is important to avoid romanticizing 
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